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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of the dividend decision. We examine the
impact of fundamental variables like earnings, size, or leverage, as well as the e¤ect
of stock price movements. Using a sample of German companies, we nd a negative
relation between the probability for dividend increases and the performance of the
rms shares. Dividend increasing companies performed worse than the overall stock
market or corporations that keep dividends constant. In addition, we demonstrate that
the documented pattern cannot be explained by models of asymmetric information
or catering considerations. Thus, our results suggest that in Germany, where share
repurchases were highly restricted, dividends are increased as a compensation for the
poor returns of the current shareholders.
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1 Introduction
Although the dividend policy of publicly listed companies has been a subject of considerable
economic research, the dividend decision is still one of the main challenges for modern nance.
We have still to understand why companies all over the world pay a substantial part of
their earnings as dividends, despite the Miller and Modigliani (1961) argument that market
valuation should not depend on the (form of) payout. The economic forces underlying the
phenomenon of dividend smoothing, documented for the rst time by Lintner (1956), are also
not clear yet. The Lintner model is considered the best description of the dividend-setting
process available" (Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997)), but it still lacks a comprehensive
theoretical justication. Moreover, surprisingly little is known about the reasons and the
timing of dividend changes and especially, dividend increases.
With this paper, we intend to enhance our understanding of two di¤erent types of factors
that drive the dividend-increase-decision. First, we study the impact of rm-specic, funda-
mental variables like size, protability and leverage ratio. Second, we aim to shed light on
the relation between dividend increases and market movements. We suppose that if share
repurchases are not feasible, the management takes not only the nancial strength of the
company into account when deciding about the dividends to be paid out but also the return
the shareholders earn. The dividend decision is made after juxtaposing the return due to
the regular dividend payment and the capital gains or losses the shareholders experience. In
hard times," when the total return is not satisfactory, dividend increases are an instrument
to smooth ru­ ed feathers among shareholders.
While the e¤ects of nancial characteristics are probably slightly better understood, an
in-depth analysis of the potential links between the dividend policy and the stock market
performance is still missing. One way to establish a link between the capital market dynamics
and the dividends paid out is by introducing asymmetric information in the analysis. The
signaling models, pioneered by Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985), consider
the payout communication device which is used by the management to reveal its private
information to the market. Agency models (Easterbrook (1984)) derive the payout policy
from the interaction between the various parties with relationships to the rm. Under
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certain circumstances, dividends may mitigate existing agency conicts, which should be
associated with an increase of the rms value. These two classes of theoretical explanations
make similar predictions about the relation between stock market dynamics and the dividend
decision: in both cases, dividends are paid out because of the prospective for a higher market
valuation. Hence, no matter if dividends are meant to communicate good news(signaling)
or if they are the good news (because of the reduction of agency conicts), one should
observe a signicant price jump after dividend increases.
The catering theory, put forward by Baker and Wurgler (2004) also allows for a relation
between the dividend policy and the stock price performance. According to this theory,
arbitrage may be limited and (irrational) investor demand may create a gap between the
stock prices of payers and non-payers. Under certain conditions, managers will rationally
cater to the demand by paying (or increasing) dividends when dividend payers are traded at
a premium. Hence, a dividend increase should be followed by a rise of the market valuation
in the year when the dividend decision is made.
In this paper, we adopt a di¤erent view. We state that one should not only study the
e¤ect of dividend payments on the price, but also look for the possibility of an inverse
relationship. The empirical support for this hypothesis is encouraging. Dividend increases
seem to be, at least partly, driven by poor stock price returns. We detect a signicantly
negative relationship between the dividend decision and the stock price return in the year
before the dividend announcement. This result holds for a variety of specications and
especially, for di¤erent return measures. In addition, as expected, we nd that dividend-
increasing rms are more protable in terms of current and past earnings to assets. Size and
market-to-book seem to have a signicantly positive impact on the dividend decision also.
The analysis was conducted using data for German companies. The main advantage
of working with German data is that in Germany, share repurchases were highly restricted
until 1999 and could not be used to disburse cash to the shareholders.1 Thus, the specics
of the institutional settings allow us to largely ignore potential biases due to the impact of
1A brief overview of the evolution of the regulation of share repurchase in Germany can be found in
Seifert and Stehle (2003). A detailed discussion is o¤ered by Benckendor¤ (1998). As a robustness check,
we repeated our analysis excluding all observations after 1999. However, we obtained qualitatively similar
results.
3
share buybacks, which in turn increases the power of our results. In addition, as most of
the related studies are based on US-data, some of our results may also be thought of as an
out-of sample test of the theories put forward.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature
and discusses the hypotheses that we aim to investigate. Section 3 describes our dataset.
The main results of the study are presented in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 4, we analyze
the determinants of the decision to increase dividends, as well as the relation between the
magnitude of dividend increases and stock price performance. The subsequent Section 5
confronts our ndings with some alternative explanations for the uncovered results. Section
6 presents the results of a robustness check, where we specify a di¤erent measure of dividend
increases. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. Since we study the determinants of dividend
increases, our work adds to the empirical literature on dividend changes. In addition, in
analyzing the impact of market movements, we also draw upon some recent ndings in
behavioral nance.
Most of the empirical literature on dividend changes has concentrated on examining the
market reaction to the announcements of the changes. Numerous papers have shown that
dividend changes are associated with price changes in the same direction, which suggests that
they are considered newsworthy by the market (see Allen andMichaely (2003) for an overview
of the literature). Somewhat more informative about the underlying reasons are studies of
the relation between dividend increases and the evolution of earnings. Their results indicate
that dividend increases are preceded by signicant earnings increases. On the other hand,
the relation between dividend changes and future earnings seems less clear, with some more
support for the notion that dividend changes do not convey valuable information (Healy and
Palepu (1988), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Benartzi,
Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler (forthcoming). Hence, it seems that dividend changes do not
signal the perspectives of the company. Instead, dividends should be better thought of as
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lagging earnings (Miller (1987)). Beside earned equity, risk and growth characteristics
of the rm have also been identied as potentially important factors. Grullon, Michaely,
and Swaminathan (2002) found that rms that increased dividends experienced a signicant
decline in their systematic risk, measured by the Fama-French three factor model or the
CAPM.
Studies of the pre-announcement stock price performance of dividend-changing rms are
relatively scarce. The existing literature suggests that dividend-increasing rms have done
well and dividend-decreasers have not done as well prior to the announcement. For instance,
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), document an average of 8.6% abnormal return in
the year prior to dividend increase and -28% for rms that decrease dividends. In Grullon,
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), dividend-increasing rms earned a signicant positive
excess return in the three years before the announcement (mean of 0.8% a month), and
dividend decreasing rms earned a signicantly negative excess return, with a mean of -0.6%
a month. In general, our results are not easily comparable with the evidence presented in the
two papers. As in the two papers cited above, we document a lower excess return of dividend-
decreasing companies. However, the main part of our analysis centers on the comparison
between dividend increasers and rms with unchanged dividends, and not on the di¤erences
between dividend increasing and dividend decreasing companies.2 Furthermore, our studies
di¤er in the methodology applied. We derive our main conclusions by investigating the
dividend decision in the context of a multivariate logit model, with the (row) stock price
return as an independent variable. On the other hand, Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan
(2002) measure the abnormal return as the mean (or median) estimated intercept in the
Fama-French three-factor model. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) do not look at the
individual stock price performance but compute the adjusted, geometrically compounded
return of equally weighted portfolios formed twelve months before the event. Neither of the
two papers allows for a potential impact of the stock price performance on the dividend
decision.
Most of the studies with German data investigate mainly the market reaction to divi-
2Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) use the characteristics of nondividend-changing rms to
compute the adjusted changes in the factor loadings. However, they do not report the adjusted excess
return.
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dend changes. The results closely resemble those for the US-market. In particular, dividend
changes are found to be associated with price changes in the same direction, with the reac-
tion following dividend decreases being signicantly stronger (Sahling (1981), Amihud and
Murgia (1997), and Gerke, Oerke, and Sentner (1997). In a recent paper, Correia da Silva,
Goergenand, and Renneboog (2005) analyze the determinants of the decision to change the
dividend for a panel of German rms from 1984 to 1994. Although our studies share sim-
ilar objectives, there are important di¤erences. While Correia da Silva, Goergenand, and
Renneboog (2005) investigate mainly the relation between protability and dividend reduc-
tions/dividend increases, we also study the impact of other factors. In particular, we relate
the decision to several individual-rm variables like size, protability, growth or leverage, but
also to external factors like share price evolution and market-wide movements. Our papers
also di¤er in the modelling approach. For most of their study, Correia da Silva, Goerge-
nand, and Renneboog (2005) analyze the dividend decision using an ordered probit model.
A potential problem with this approach is that it implicitly assumes that dividend increases
and dividend decreases are symmetric decisions, driven by similar factors. However, this
may not necessarily be the case. The signicantly di¤erent market reaction to increases and
decreases indicates that the two types of decisions are perceived as inherently di¤erent by
the market.
The nature of our results links this paper to behavioral nance literature.3 The foundation
of the modern behavioral-nance-based dividend theory is laid out by Baker and Wurgler
(2004) who outline and test some of the predictions of the catering theory. Using data
between 1963 and 2000, they nd a strong relation between measures of the relative price of
payers and nonpayers and measures of the aggregate dynamics of dividend initiations in the
US. The catering theory was found to be able to explain not only the dynamics of dividend
payers but was also identied as an important factor for the decision to initiate (Bulan,
Subramanian, and Tanlu (2004)) or increase the dividends (Lie and Li (2005)). Bulan,
Subramanian, and Tanlu (2004) showed that dividend initiating companies are bigger, more
3In fact, the most convincing explanation for our ndings can hardly be reconciled with the traditional
Miller-Modigliani framework. Under the rational-expectation paradigm, dividend increases cannot be meant
to compensate shareholders for the poor return on their investment because they will be associated with an
additional price drop of the same magnitude.
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protable, have less growth opportunities, and dispose of more free-cash ow. In addition,
their results suggest a positive relation between the dividend premium and the initiation
decision, which is in line with the catering theory. Consequently, the announcement e¤ect
is partly explained by the market sentiment for dividends. Lie and Li (2005) nd that
the decision to change the dividend, and by what magnitude, depends on the premium the
capital market places on dividends. The stock market reaction to dividend changes seems to
depend on the dividend premium, too. However, in their study of aggregate dividend payouts
Dittmar and Dittmar (2004) do not detect a signicant impact of the dividend premium.
3 Data, Methodology, and Summary Statistics
Using the Datastream database, we create a sample of all the German companies that ap-
pear in the database for the period 1982-2003. To construct our sample, we make use of the
constituent lists fger1, fger2and deadbd. The rst two lists contain equities currently
traded (active stocks) and the last one includes stocks that have ceased trading (dead
stocks in the terminology of Datastream). We exclude stocks of Non-German companies
(identied by the geographical code GEOG), preferred shares as well as various convertibles
and participating certicates. Financial rms are also deleted because of the di¤erent struc-
ture of their accounts. As the Frankfurt Stock Exchange is by far the largest of the eight
German stock exchanges, we include only shares traded in Frankfurt in our nal sample.
Thus, we also avoid potential problems of dealing with companies listed on more than one
domestic exchange.
From the remaining stocks, we form an unbalanced panel dataset using the date when
the company went public (DS-item BDATE). If the IPO took place in the second half of
the year, the corresponding yearly observation is deleted. The month in which a dead
stockceased trading is assessed from monthly price data. Our price measure is the actual
historical price of the share (DS-item UP), taken from the Frankfurt continuous market.4
Because Datastream lls the time period after delisting with constant values equal to the
last available data, we delete all monthly observations with zero returns going back to the
4For shares not traded continuously, Datastream uses the midday Kassa" price.
7
rst non-zero return. Companies delisted in the rst half of a year are eliminated from the
list of companies in that year.
For all the companies in our dataset, we gather various rm-specic nancial data from
the Datastream database. To be included in our nal sample, a rm-year observation must
have nonmissing values for total assets (DS item 392), equity capital (301), operating prot
(993), ebit (1300), number of shares outstanding (nosh), and dividends. Dividends are
dened as total amount of dividends paid (434). If the total amount is missing, we use
equity dividends paid (1129) or ordinary dividend requirements (187) instead. Further, we
use but do not require: total borrowing repayable within a year (309), total loan capital (321),
capital expenditures (1024), annual prot (175), intangible assets (344), reserves (304), total
deferred taxes (wc03263), depreciation (136), and date of scal year end (wc05350). Based
on the scal year end, we redene some annual observations, assigning companies with a
scal year end before July 1st to the previous year. Non-credible data, like i.e., negative
total assets or debt exceeding total assets, are eliminated. All of the variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile to avoid the inuence of extreme observations.
The nal sample contains 844 companies with a total of 6671 rm-year observations over
the period 1982 to 2003.5 For each observation, we create the following variables:
 Market value: average unadjusted price in a year times shares outstanding. The average
is taken over the monthly end prices.
 Size: Percent of companies with the same or lower amount of market value.
 Current growth (d(TA)=TA): growth rate of total assets. Total assets are dened as
total assets (392), net of intangible assets (344) if available.
 Total debt (Debt): short-term debt (309) plus long term debt (321).
 Market-to-Book Ratio (MtB): the sum of market value and total debt divided by the
sum of book equity and total debt.
5The relatively low number of observations per company (on average, there are 7.9 observations available
for each company) is because the most rms appear in the sample after 1990 or 2001. However, as noted
above, this does not a¤ect the nature of our ndings. We obtain similar results if we conduct our analysis
excluding all observations after 1999.
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 Leverage Ratio (Debt=TA): total debt to total assets.
 Capital Expenditures (Cap:Exp:): capital expenditures divided by total assets
We measure protability either by ebit (1300) or by operating prot (993), both scaled
by total assets.
Furthermore, we use the time series of annual returns of DAX, CDAX, and REX, con-
structed using data from Deutsche Börse. For the period before Deutsche Börse launched
DAX in 1988 and CDAX in 1993, we use the annual returns of the two indices as calculated
by Stehle and Hartmond (1991).
A dividend increase is dened as a higher ordinary cash dividend, compared to the
dividend paid out in the previous year. A dividend decrease is the di¤erence between the year
t dividend and the year t  1 dividend, provided the di¤erence is negative. Companies with
positive dividend payments in their rst year are excluded. We also exclude all observations
identied as dividend initiations or dividend omissions. When analyzing the amount of
dividend increases, we scale each dividend payment by the amount of total assets.
We assign dividends for the scal year t to year t of our sample and will refer to as current
dividends.6 The same rule is applied to the variables derived from balance sheet or income
statement gures. Our measures of the return in year t (referred to as current return) are
based on price data from the calendar year t. Because the dividend for the scal year t is
usually announced (and paid out) in the rst half of the next year (t+1), the current return
measures should not contain information about the subsequent dividend changes.7
We investigate Hypothesis 1 by relating the dividend decision to various measures of
stock market movements. Our key measure of stock price performance is dened as the
6In Germany, dividends are paid on annual basis.
7This may not hold if the scal year does not concur with the calendar year or if the announcement
is made before the scal year end. However, for the most of the companies in our sample, scal year is
the calendar year. In addition, we also checked the precise announcement date of some randomly selected
companies using articles and news published on the German business newspaper Handelsblatt. All of the
rms announced the dividend to be pay out after the scal year end. Finally, note that it is not quite clear
whether potential misclassication due to the approach applied may bias our ndings, and if yes, in what
direction.
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stock price at the end of December divided by the stock price one year ago minus one:
R12 =
p12;t   p12;t 1
p12;t 1
(1)
We opt for this particular return measure because the stock price and the annual return as
of the end of the year are widely used in the corporate nance literature (see e.g., Benartzi,
Michaely, and Thaler (1997), Fama and French (2001), or Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)).
However, since we cannot completely ensure that the stock price in December does not con-
tain any information about the upcoming dividend change, we will also regress the dividend
decision to the June-to-June return of the share R06:
R06 =
p06;t   p06;t 1
p06;t 1
(2)
In addition, we use various measures of the relative share price performance of the company
to control for the impact of the overall stock market movements. In general, the relative
stock price performance is dened as the annual return of the share minus the annual return
of the corresponding proxy for stock market movements. The proxies for market movements
are derived from the annual return of the overall share market index (CDAX), the mean
annual return of the companies in the sample, and the annual return of the CDAX index in
excess of the xed-income index REX. We use price indexes only in order to avoid potential
reverse causality problems.
The numbers of dividend increases by year are displayed in Table 1. The Table also
details the number of companies in the sample in every year as well as the dynamics of
dividend decreases and the number of observations with unchanged dividends. The relative
frequency of increases, decreases, and unchanged dividends is similar to the rates documented
by Dewenter and Warther (1998) for the US and Japan and by Rahman (2002) in his sample
covering 28 countries. Dividend increases are the most often observed events. For more than
50 percent of all rm-year observations with positive past and current payout, the dividend
in t exceeds the last years value. The dividend reduction rate is relatively high, compared
to the results reported in studies with US-data. Depending on how we measure dividends,
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the rate varies between 19 and 30 percent. These gures contrast sharply to the dividend
decrease frequency of 5.5 percent documented by Dewenter and Warther (1998) for the US.
This discrepancy indicates that German companies are less reluctant to reduce dividends.
The results of the descriptive analysis of Rahman (2002) also point in that direction. The
dividend reduction rate in Germany (equal to 21%) was found to be about twice that of the
US (10.9%). A similar view is expressed by Correia da Silva, Goergenand, and Renneboog
(2005), who suggest that the dividend policy of German companies tends to be more exible
than that of their US- of UK-counterparts.
In general, there is no big di¤erence if one identies increases, decreases, and unchanged
dividends according to the amount spent on dividends or the dividends per share. Although
we detect some minor di¤erences between the outcomes of the two classication methods,
the composition of the sample remains nearly the same. The relative proportion of dividend
decreasers is slightly higher if one classies the rm-year observations according to their
dividends per share. This indicates that sometimes increases of the amount paid out as
dividends are overcompensated by a higher number of shares outstanding, which translates
into lower dividends per share.
4 Empirical Results
This section presents our main empirical results on the driving forces behind the dividend
decision. We start with simple descriptive analysis. In the next step, the dividend decision
is investigated in the context of a multivariate logit model. Alternative modeling approaches
are discussed in the Robustness section.
Drawing on the existing literature, we link the dividend decision to various rm-specic
accounting variables. Numerous papers suggest that dividend changes are mainly driven by
(changes in the) past and current earnings. We attempt to examine the issue by relating the
increase decision to measures of past and current protability. The size of the company is
expected to have a similar impact as the protability measures. Bigger companies are hy-
pothesized to be more prone to rising the payout because they dispose of higher cash reserves
and generate less volatile earnings (Fama and French (2002)). We also include the leverage
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ratio in the regression, expecting to nd evidence that higher debt levels translate into lower
probability for a dividend increase. Finally, we study the e¤ects of capital expenditures,
current growth rate, and the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the expected growth.
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 2 reports the means of key nancial variables for the companies classied as dividend
increasers, dividend decreasers, or rms with unchanged dividends. Dividend increasers are
slightly larger than most of the companies in the sample. The generated earnings (in terms
of ebit and operating prot) are also higher. Somewhat surprisingly, they do not seem to
invest signicantly less or grow slower. The mean of the capital expenditures of dividend
increasing companies exceeds the amount spent by rms with unchanged dividends. In line
with this nding, dividend increasers exhibit higher current growth, measured by the yearly
change of the total assets. The higher mean leverage ratio suggests that this expansion is
nanced (partly) by debt. However, in spite of the higher debt ratio, the free cash ow is
(slightly) higher, mainly because of the high level of generated (and retained) earnings.
Dividend decreasing companies exhibit the worst operating performance among the three
groups. Their earnings declined over the last year; investments and asset growth are below
the levels of dividend increasers or rms with unchanged dividends. Corresponding to the
weak fundamentals, the stock market valuation, as measured by the market to book ratio,
is signicantly lower than the valuation of the remaining companies in the sample. The
stock price follows a similar pattern. According to Table 3, dividend decreasers earn a
negative stock price return on average. The two key measures of stock price performance-
the December-to-December return R12 and the adjusted return R12 Mean(R12) - are highly
negative.
The results in Table 3 indicate that dividend increases are preceded by poor stock price
performance, too. The mean annual stock price return of  2:26% is lower than the return of
dividend decreasing companies and signicantly below the return of stocks with unchanged
dividends. The poor return also causes the total return to the shareholders of dividend
increasing rms to fall below that of the control groups. However, the mean adjusted return,
which takes account of the aggregate market movements is positive. This suggests that
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dividend increases follow not only individual stock price underperformance but also overall
market downturns.
To summarize, our results so far demonstrate that companies tend to change the dividends
after years of poor stock price performance. However, while dividend decreases come along
with weak operating performance, which in turn may explain the negative market reaction,
dividend increasers exhibit a sound nancial development, which is not reected by the stock
price.
4.2 Multivariate analysis of the Dividend Decision
We study the relative importance of fundamentals and market movements for the dividend
decision using discrete choice models. We specify two multivariate logit models in which the
dependent variable is 1 if a rm changes the amount distributed to the shareholders and
0 if the dividend is kept constant. The explanatory variables are size, current and lagged
protability, growth rate of assets, market-to-book ratio, leverage, capital expenditures, and
past dividends. Following Correia da Silva, Goergenand, and Renneboog (2005), we also
include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a loss (negative EBIT ) in
period t. Our modeling approach treats decreases and increases as two inherently di¤erent
decisions, driven by di¤erent factors. However, the main results are not a¤ected by the
particular methodology applied. As a robustness check, we specied the dividend decision
as an ordered logit or multivariate logit model.8
4.2.1 Dividend Increases
Table 4 contains the test results for the basic regression model of the increase decision. The
dependent variable is 1 if a rm increases the amount distributed to the shareholders via
dividends and 0 if the dividend is kept constant. Model (1) studies the relation between
the probability of dividend increases and the nancial characteristics of the companies in
the sample. The results indicate that there are two fundamental variables which play a
crucial role. The coe¢ cient of past earnings is highly signicant and has the expected sign.
8The results are presented in Secion 6.2.
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High current and especially high past earnings translate into higher probability for dividend
increases. The coe¢ cient of the size measure is found to be signicantly positive, which
indicates that large rms are more likely to raise their dividends. In contrast to studies with
US-data (Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), Deshmukh (2003)), we could not
nd any evidence of an adverse impact of investments and current growth on the dividend
decision of German companies. Partly conrming this pattern, we estimate a signicantly
positive e¤ect of the market-to-book ratio. Thus, it is safe to conclude that in Germany the
dividend decision does not reect the investment and growth opportunities of the company.
As rst shown by Lintner (1956), there is a strong relation between dividend increases and
previously paid dividends. Firms that pay out a higher portion of their total assets are less
prone to raise the amount disbursed to the shareholders.
Models (2) to (5) examine the relation between the dividend decision and the (individual)
stock return of the company in the year before the dividend announcement. Controlling for
the stock price performance does not alter the estimated relation between the probability
for a dividend increase and the fundamental variables. Again, we detect a signicant impact
of protability, size, and lagged dividends.
The probability for dividend increases seems to be negatively related to the stock price
return. The two measures applied are both signicant and have the expected negative sign.
The higher the price drop in t the more likely the management is to raise the payout. In
order to control for potential intertemporal e¤ects, we also included lagged value of the
return measures in the regression. However, past stock price development does not seem
to be an important factor. The estimated coe¢ cients are insignicant and do not exhibit a
stable behavior. This suggests that dividends are paid out to compensate shareholders for
foregonecapital gains in the year before the dividend announcement, the decision is not
related to the return in t  1.
Following this line of argumentation, it is not surprising that we get slightly higher
p-values for the December-to-December return measure. The June-to-June-return reects
partly past" stock price movements and does not capture to the full extent of the stock
price performance in the currentyear.
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The regression results so far indicate that the individual stock price performance is a
major factor. However, it is also possible that there are more dividends paid out in bear
markets, when the whole market goes down. In the rst case, one can think of the dividend
decision as being made after comparing the total return the shareholders earn with the return
of the stocks of competing companies. In the second case, the relevant benchmark is the
return of alternative investment opportunities like placing money with a bank or purchasing
xed-income products.
As outlined above, some of the ndings of the descriptive analysis suggest that the two
e¤ects play some role. The return of dividend increasing companies is below that of rms
with constant positive dividends; adjusting the annual returns for overall market movements
narrows the gap between the two groups. However, even if we control for the mean return
of the remaining companies, we still document a signicantly lower return of increasers.
In what follows, we will investigate this issue further by relating the dividend decision to
aggregate stock market movements.
Table 5 contains the results. We found a signicant impact of nearly all variables of
interest. As demonstrated by Columns (1) to (4), the impact of the measures of overall
market movements closely resembles the impact of the individual return variables. Although
the 22 available yearly observations are probably not enough to draw reliable statistical
inferences, the economic implications of the regressions provide further support for the notion
that dividend increases are partly driven by poor stock price performance. In down markets,
the annual returns of most of the companies are not satisfactory. Hence, dividends become
more valuable for the shareholders. They are the only source of positive return and the
managers, who seem to recognize that, try to actively contribute to the total returns of
the companys owners. As a result, the management increases the dividend. This holds
regardless of how we proxy for down markets, as shown by the rst four specications.
The remaining two models study the question of whether the individual stock price
performance or aggregate market movements are the main determinants of the dividend
decision. In model (5), the dependent variable is related to the di¤erence between the
annual December-to-December stock return R12 and the mean return of all the companies in
the sample, model (6) links the decision to increase the dividends to the stock return and the
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return of the CDAX price index. The estimated coe¢ cients in (5) and (6) are signicantly
negative and have the same sign. These results suggest that dividends are not automatically
increased in down markets. Instead, it seems that when deciding about the dividend, the
management takes the evolution of the individual stock price into account. The slopes of the
excess return measures are all negative and mostly signicant. Thus, it is safe to conclude
that dividend increases are partly triggered by downward price movements, with companies
underperforming the overall market being more likely to raise the amount distributed to the
shareholders.
4.2.2 Dividend Decreases
Table 6 extends our analysis to the case of dividend decreases. The dependent variable is
1 if a rm decrease the amount distributed to the shareholders via dividends and 0 if the
dividend is kept constant. In each of the specications, the size variable has a positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect on the likelihood that the dividend is cut. Together with the
evidence on dividend increases, this suggests that small companies are less likely to change
the dividends. When a company is smaller (and younger), it tends to follow a more stable
policy. The probability of a dividend decrease is higher when a company reports a negative
EBIT. In line with the ndings of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1992), we estimate a signicantly
positive coe¢ cient of the earnings loss dummy. Finally, the slope of the capital expenditures
is also found to be signicant. The negative sign suggests that the declining protability
causes the company to reduce not only the payout but also the investments.
The inclusion of the return measure does not materially alter the relation between the
fundamental variables and the decrease decision. Although we estimated several specica-
tions, we cannot detect any evidence of a signicant impact of the stock price performance. In
contrast to dividend increasers, the nding of the descriptive analysis that dividend decreas-
ing companies earn a negative return in the pre-announcement period should be attributed
to their poor operating performance; the poor stock price performance itself does not seem
to inuence the decrease decision.
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5 Discussion of the Results
Our results so far suggest that market movements have a signicant impact on the decision
of whether to increase the dividend or keep it constant. This pattern may be explained
by models of asymmetric information. The asymmetric-information-view hypothesizes that
dividends are increased either to communicate private information to the market (signaling)
or to mitigate existing agency conicts between management and shareholders (agency).
Both types of models may generate a price process consistent with our ndings from the
previous sections. Implicitly, they assume that the company is traded at a discount prior
to the announcement of dividend increases. Under certain circumstance, this may manifest
into poor stock price performance.
One way to distinguish between the competing explanations is by looking at the com-
panys performance after the dividends are increased. No matter if dividends are paid out
to communicate good news(signaling) or they are the good news,one should observe
a signicant price jump or an improvement of the operating performance after dividend
increases.
The ndings of Fuller and Goldstein (2005) o¤er another economic rationale for some
of our result. They presented evidence that dividend-paying stock outperform non-dividend
paying stocks in declining market stronger than in advancing markets. If the same pattern
holds in Germany, managers may tend to increase the amount disbursed to the shareholders
since this will result in a more favorable market valuation. Closely related to that line of
argumentation is the catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004). One can reconcile the
catering view with our ndings by assuming that the market values dividend increasers at a
premium in times when the overall stock market return is low. However, note that these two
explanations can only rationalize the negative relation between the increase decision and the
aggregate market movements; they cannot account for the negative impact of the individual
return measures.
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5.1 Post-Announcement Price Performance
In this section, we are going to examine a very basic condition for the asymmetric-information
view. Numerous papers have shown that the market reacts positively to dividend increases
in the short run (Aharony and Swary (1980), Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995), Gerke,
Oerke, and Sentner (1997)). However, if dividends are really meant to communicate some
sort of fundamental information or to mitigate existing agency conicts, one should detect
not only signicant short-term reaction to dividend increases, but also a signicant rise of
the market value in the middle term.
We investigate the development of the market valuation of dividend increasing companies
using a simple categorical analysis, measuring market valuation as market-to-book ratio or
stock price in every quarter of the year. Table 7 contains our results. The table reports
median market-to-book ratios changes of the ratios. The second part of the table presents
median price changes (unadjusted returns) as well as adjusted returns over the two years
before and after the dividend announcement. We derive our conclusions by comparing the
variables of interest of three di¤erent groups. Specically, we contrast quarterly returns and
changes of the market-to-book for all the rms that increase the dividend (group increaser)
with the corresponding measures for rms that keep the dividend constant (continues)
and rms that reduce dividends (decreases). To ensure that the dividend decision is
announced in Q1t+1 or Q2t+1, we excluded rms with nancial year end di¤erent from the
calendar year end.
The calculated market-to-book ratios are relatively stable. For dividend decreasing com-
panies, we nd a positive reaction to the announcement of dividend decreases. The ratio
rises continuously from Q4t to Q2t+11. On the other hand, the median market-to-book of
increasersfalls steadily until Q2t+1. This translates into negative change rates, as depicted
at the bottom part of the table. Initially, dividend increasers have higher market-to-books,
but starting in Q4t, they get surpasses by companies with constant dividends. However, the
di¤erence between the two groups is not signicant. Especially the fact that in the periods
following the dividend decision, increasers do not signicantly outperform the remaining
companies in the sample is troubling for the signaling and agency theory. Their market-to-
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book seems to have the highest growth rate in Q2t+1 but also in this case the di¤erence is
not signicant.
Examining the dynamics of the median quarterly returns provides further evidence against
the view that dividend increases contain some sort of fundamental information. We could
not detect any signicant upward shift at the time when dividend increases are announced.
Adjusting the return measure for overall market movements does not change the pattern.
In summary, our results show that the market does not react to the announcement of
dividend increases. The missingstock market reaction indicates that dividend increases
are not considered relevant information for the companys valuation.
Contrary to the evidence we presented, studies with US data tend to report a positive
long-term stock market reaction to dividend increases. In an early work, Charest (1978)
found a 4% abnormal return in the two years after a dividend increase announcement. Al-
though there are some limitations to his study because of the time period analyzed, a positive
market reaction to dividend increases was also documented by Michaely, Thaler, and Wom-
ack (1995) or Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002).
However, one should not be quick to interpret these results as supportive for the information-
based view of the dividend policy. First of all, a positive market reaction is only a necessary
condition for signaling or agency, not a su¢ cient one. This leads us to the more basic ques-
tion of what kind of information the dividends are supposed to convey. In two prominent
papers, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler
(forthcoming) demonstrated convincingly that dividend increases are not associated with
signicant earnings improvements in the next years. This implies that the dividend decision
does not convey information about future earnings and protability. Rather, it seems that
it is associated with changes in the risk prole of dividend increasing companies. Venkatesh
(1998) reports a decline in the overall volatility of returns when rms commence dividend
payments. Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) found that rms that increased div-
idends experienced a signicant decline in systematic risk, while dividend decreasing com-
panies exhibited a signicant increase in systematic risk. However, the idea that dividends
are meant to reveal a lower risk cannot explain why the dividend decision is preceded by
negative stock price returns.
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A further problem is that all studies found that prices continued to drift in the same
direction in the year following an announcement. The existence of a drift implies that even
if dividends convey valuable information, the market does not get the full extent of the sig-
nal immediately, as predicted by the rationality assumption of the models. This may cast
doubts on the validity of the results if one believes that the stock market is e¢ cient. In
particular, the presence of post-dividend announcement drift may indicate that the return
measures are biased, for instance because they are based on misspecied asset pricing mod-
els and, therefore, do not control for changes in the risk prole (Fama (1998), Boehme and
Sorescu (2002)). For those who are not convinced of the e¢ ciency of the market, the post-
announcement drift could indicate the presence of market undervaluation at the time when
dividends were increased rather than positive stock market reaction. Although ex-post mea-
sures of misvaluation are subject to several critiques (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2005)),
the pattern could be thought of as evidence for the notion that dividend increases reect
managements attempt to prevent the shareholders from selling their stocks in times when
the rm is undervalued (Allen and Michaely (2003)).
Finally, although international studies of the long-term post-announcement performance
are rare, their results are not always consistent with the US evidence. Gunasekarage and
Power (2002) report that UK companies, which announce a reduction in dividends (and
earnings) outperform their dividend increasing counterparts. This implies that dividend
reduction is a stronger signal of positive future prospectives, which is exactly the opposite
of what the information-based theories predict. A similar pattern is uncovered by Gwilym,
Seaton, and Thomas (2004). They found that the stock price performance of non-increasers
is superior to the price return of dividend increasers.
5.2 Dividend Changes and Future Protability
In this section, we examine a second prediction of the asymmetric information models, that
dividend increases are followed by higher protability in the post-announcement period.
We study the relation between future earnings changes and the dividend decision using a
regression-analysis framework where we can control for the expectations of the market. In
order to mitigate concerns about model misspecication, we test two di¤erent regressions.
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The linear model of Nissim and Ziv (2001) allows for asymmetric reaction to dividend in-
creases and decreases and controls for uniform mean reversion and momentum in earnings.
Our second regression specications controls for potential non-linearities in the time series
of earnings. Following Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler (forthcoming), we examine
the relation between dividend changes and earnings changes using the partial adjustment
model of Fama and French (2000).
We start with the regression specication that Nissim and Ziv (2001) use in their study.
Specically, we estimate the following regression model:
CE1 = 0 + 1pDPC + 1nDNC + 2ROA0 + 3CE0 + " (3)
CE1 stands for the change in earnings from 0 to 1: CE1 = (Y1   Y0)=TA0, where Yt is
operating prot in year t and TA0 is the book value of assets at the end of year 0. DPC
(DNC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for positive (negative) dividend changes
and 0 otherwise, ROA0 is equal to operating prot in year 0, scaled by total assets at the
end of year 0.
Our second regression specication explicitly accounts for potential non-linearities in the
evolution of earnings. It assumes that earnings changes can be written as follows:
CE1 = 0 + 1pDPC + 1nDNC+
+ (1 + 2NDFED0 + 3NDFED0 DFE0 + 4PDFED0 DFE0) DFE0+
+ (1 + 2NCED0 + 3NCED0  CE0 + 4PCED0  CE0)  CE0 + " (4)
DFE0 is equal to ROA0   E [ROA0], where E [ROA0] is the tted value from the cross-
sectional regression of ROA0 on the logarithm of total assets in year -1, the logarithm of the
market-to-book ratio in year -1, and ROA 1. NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. NCED0 (PCED0)
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise.
Specication 4 builds on the existing empirical literature for the US, which suggests that
the earnings process is highly non-linear (Brooks and Buckmaster (1976), Elgers and Lo
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(1994), Fama and French (2000)). As discussed by Fama and French (2000), the model is
designed to capture the fact that large changes in earnings revert faster than small changes
and that negative changes revert faster than positive changes. Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely,
and Thaler (forthcoming) demonstrate convincingly that assuming linearity when the true
functional form is non-linear might leave out important information, which seems to be
correlated with dividend changes. As a result, the estimates of a linear model are likely to
be biased.
Table 8 reports our results. The rst column contains the estimates of Equation (3).
Unlike Nissim and Ziv (2001), we nd no evidence that dividend changes contain information
about future earnings. The coe¢ cients for DPC and DNC are not signicantly di¤erent
from zero. Somewhat surprisingly, we document a strong reversal pattern in the evolution of
earnings. The estimated coe¢ cients of ROA0 and CE0 are both signicantly negative, which
suggests that positive earnings changes and higher protability in year 0 are associated with
negative earnings changes in the future. This contrasts to the results of US-studies (Nissim
and Ziv (2001), Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler (forthcoming)), where earnings
changes in the year after the dividend announcement are found to be positively related to
contemporaneous earnings changes.
The second column reports the estimates of (4). The evidence in the table indicates that
the behavior of protability is highly non-linear. The corresponding coe¢ cients of the most
of the measures in (4) were found to be signicantly di¤erent from zero. Thus, it seems
that the linear model indeed ignores important information about the evolution of earnings.
In line with conjecture, we nd that the non-linear model explains a larger fraction of the
cross-sectional variation in earnings changes than the linear model. The adjusted R-squared
increases from 0.051 to 0.208. Again, we do not detect any evidence of a signaling power
of the dividend decision. The coe¢ cients on dividend increases and decreases are neither
economically nor statistically signicant.
Overall, it seems that dividend changes do not convey any information about future
earnings changes. The results of the regression analysis suggest that the dividend decision
is not associated with unexpected changes of the future operating performance. In turn,
this implies that the documented negative relation between the probability for dividend
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increases and the stock price return can be hardly thought of as evidence in favor of the
asymmetric-information models.
5.3 Do Dividends Matter More in Declining Markets?
Fuller and Goldstein (2005) demonstrate that dividend-paying stocks outperform non-dividend-
paying stocks in declining markets and attribute this phenomenon to varying investorspref-
erences. If investorspreferences depend on the state of the market, with investors valuing
dividends more in declining markets, then a company may boos its market value by announc-
ing dividend increases. To investigate this hypothesis, we calculate the return of dividend
increasing companies in up and down markets and compare it to the price performance of
rms with stable dividends. Table 9 summarizes the results.
The rst part of the table depicts the return of dividend-paying and of non-dividend-
paying stocks. In addition to showing results for the whole market (in the rst row), the table
presents evidence for the years where the market was classied as declining or advancing. In
order to ensure the robustness of our results, we adopted two measures of declining markets.
We partition the sample according to the annual or to the annual adjusted return of the
CDAX index. The later measure is dened as the di¤erence between the return of the
CDAX and the REX index. The next two parts of the table compare the return of dividend-
increasing and dividend-maintaining stocks in the year before the dividend announcement
(second part of the tables) and for the year when the dividend decision is announced.
The results indicate that in declining markets dividend-payers signicantly outperform
non-dividend paying stocks. Depending of how we dene declining markets, the di¤erence
is either 0:216 or 0:204. However, in advancing markets we get the reverse picture. Now,
non-dividend-paying stocks outperform; the return di¤erence is again signicant at the 1%-
level. For the overall sample, we detect a slight outperformance of dividend-paying stocks.
However, because of the asymmetric stock price development in advancing and declining
markets, the di¤erence between the two groups is not signicant.
While the rst part of the table backs the idea of Fuller and Goldstein (2005) that in
declining market investors may trade dividend payers at a premium, the remaining two parts
demonstrate that this can hardly o¤er an explanation for our ndings. Regardless of how we
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proxy for down markets, we do not nd any evidence of a superior stock price performance of
dividend increasing companies. For all the cases examined, dividend increasers exhibit lower
returns than rms with stable dividends. In the pre-announcement period, they perform
signicantly worse in down markets, which is not surprising given our results. However,
even after the dividend decision is announced, the numbers in the table do not suggest any
preferential treatment by the investors.
5.4 Catering Theory
The last alternative explanation that we investigate is the catering theory of dividend policy.
The empirical analysis of the catering theory centers on the so-called dividend premium.
The dividend premium is the di¤erence between the logs of aggregate market-to-book ratio
of dividend payers and the market-to-book ratio of non-dividend payers. We specify this
measure in two di¤erent ways. The equally weighted dividend premium averages the market-
to-books across payers and non-payers in each year. The value-weighted dividend premium
is the di¤erence between the logs of the weighted sums of market-to-book of dividend payers
and non-payers; the associated weight equals the ratio of the companys market value to
the sum of the market values of dividend payers or non-payers.9 A potential drawback of
this variable is that it may not only proxy for investorssentiment toward dividends, but
also reect the relative investment opportunity of dividend payers and non-dividend payers.
To mitigate this problem, we also regress the market-to-book to the current growth of the
company and formulate the dividend premium using the residuals from that regression.
Table 10 incorporates the measures in a logit regression. The relation between the two
dividend-premium measures and the increase decision does not behave in the way hypothe-
sized by the catering theory. The estimated coe¢ cients in (1) and (2) are not signicant and
do not have the same sign. Thus, our results are more in line with the ndings of Dittmar
and Dittmar (2004) who showed that the dividend premium does not explain changes of ag-
gregate dividends in the US. Unlike Lie and Li (2005), we do not nd any evidence that, on
the individual level, rms are more likely to increase dividends when the dividend premium
9The time series of our dividend premium measures closely resembles those constructed by Denis and
Osobov (2005) in their international study of dividend policy.
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is large. The partly conicting evidence may be due to the di¤erent institutional settings
(especially the role of the stock market) but may also stem from the problem that the market-
to-book ratio includes information about the protability of investment. A major problem
for all sentiment measures based on market-to-book ratios is that the market-to-book may
serve as a proxy for existing irrational overvaluation but may also just represent a rational
valuation of the current or expected growth of the company. In our case, this means that
the logged di¤erence between the market-to-books of dividend payers and non-payers may
also represent the di¤erent growth prospects of the two kinds of rms, and not necessarily
reect the market sentiment for dividend payments.
We approach this problem in two ways. First, we try to isolate the two potential e¤ects by
controlling for the current growth rate of dividend payers and non-payers in the regression. To
ensure the robustness of the results, we apply two growth measures. We include the current
growth rate of the total assets of payers and non-payers in the regression. In addition, we
also use the di¤erence between the logs of the aggregated capital expenditures (deated by
total assets). In our second strategy, we regress the companiesmarket-to-book ratios on
the current assets growth or capital expenditures measure and use the residuals from the
regression to compute a proxy for the dividend premium. Since it turned out that the so
calculated (and equally weighted) market-to-book ratio of non-payers might become negative,
we construct a proxy, which is slightly di¤erent than the original one. In particular, our
measure is equal to the mean market-to-book of non-payers, divided by the mean market-to-
book of dividend payers. Since this measure increases if the market valuation of non-payers
increases, we will refer to it as dividend discount. If the sentiment manifests itself in
the market-to-book ratios in the way predicted by the catering theory, we should obtain a
negative coe¢ cient for the dividend discount variable.
However, our results do not support this hypothesis. As shown by specications (3)
to (6), the estimated slopes of the dividend discount variables are mostly not signicant.
This holds regardless of the adjustment method applied. Thus, the poor performance of the
dividend premium measure does not seem to be caused by potential conicts between the
two overlapping e¤ects it may stand for. It may rather be due to the di¤erent corporate
governance structures in Germany, compared to those in the US. The results of Denis and
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Osobov (2005) o¤er some support for this hypothesis. In a cross-country comparison of the
time trends in the dividend policy, they documented a systematic di¤erence in the time series
of the dividend premium between the common law and civil law countries. Since civil law
countries are largely believed to rely more on debt than on equity nancing, it is possible
that the market-to-book ratio does not play such a vital role in the managements decisions.
6 Robustness Check
6.1 Time Series Issues
A potential problem of our data is the changing composition of the sample. The number of
rms goes from 67 in 1982 to over 600 in 2002. The last four years account for nearby 40%
of all rm-year observations while, on the other hand, for the years between 2000 and 2002
the CDAX and the DAX index generate a negative return. To verify that our results are
not driven by the end of sample period, we repeated our analysis including year dummies
or using Fama-Macbeth (Fama and MacBeth (1973)) style regressions to capture potential
year xed e¤ects. Tables 11 and 12 report the results.
The two type of regression estimations generate similar results. Overall, controlling for
time xed e¤ects does not yield the nature of our ndings. The rst three columns in
Tables 11 and 12 study the increase decision. Size, (past) protability, and past dividends
are again deemed the most important fundamental factors. The coe¢ cients of the return
measure exhibit similar behavior as in the specications without xed e¤ects. We detect
a signicantly negative relation between the stock price performance in the year before the
dividend announcement and the probability for dividend increases. Including year xed
e¤ects seems to increase the explanatory power of our specication. Although Pseudo-R2s
are known to be imperfect measures of overall explanatory power, the R2s in Table 11 are all
in the 10% region for models that include year dummies, versus the 7:5% 8% for regressions
without year dummies.
The econometric model of dividend decreases (specications (4) to (6)) is not robust to
introducing time xed e¤ects in the regression. Including year dummies renders the most of
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the fundamental variables insignicant. In Table (11), the proxy for negative earnings is the
only one variable with signicant coe¢ cient in all the specications examined. On the other
hand, estimating the model using Fama-Macbeth methodology suggests a negative impact
of the capital expenditures and a positive impact of the past dividends on the decrease
decision. However, regardless of the methodology applied, we estimate qualitatively similar
coe¢ cients of the return measure.
6.2 Ordinal Logit Models
Following Amihud and Li (2002) and Correia da Silva, Goergenand, and Renneboog (2005),
we also modeled the dividend decision as an ordinal variable. We estimated an ordered
logit model, where the dependent variable takes the values +1, 0, or -1 if the dividend
decision is an increase, no change, or decrease, compared to the dividend in the previous
year. As an advantage of this model, is has been often claimed that it explicitly takes
into account the ordinal nature of dividend decision (Correia da Silva, Goergenand, and
Renneboog (2005)). However, a major drawback of the approach is that it assumes that
the e¤ects of the explanatory variables on the cumulative response probabilities are constant
across all categories of the ordinal response. That is, it states that the independent variables
have the same e¤ect on the increase and on the decrease decision. However, our results so
far suggest that this can hardly be the case. Decreases and increases seem to be inherently
di¤erent, with di¤erent driving forces behind the two decision. Applying some standard
statistical tests provides further support for this view: for instance, the likelihood ratio test
computes a chi-square of 256:68. We attempt to take care of that problem by estimating the
ordered logit model using the more general procedure of Peterson and Harrell (1990) that
allows for a impact of the explanatory variables across categories.
Table 13 summarizes our results. The rst three columns contain the estimates of the
standard ordinal logit model, the remaining models present the regression coe¢ cients com-
puted using the generalized procedure. In (4) and (6), we compare dividend decreases with
constant dividends, (5) and (7) study the di¤erences between dividend increasers and rms
with constant dividends. The evidence in the Table supports our previous results: in (2)
and (5), the coe¢ cient of R12 is negative and signicant. Thus, the e¤ect of the stock price
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performance on the dividend increase decision seems to be robust to alternative modelings
of the dividend decision.
6.3 Changes of the number of shares outstanding
As a nal robustness check, we examine di¤erent measures of stock price performance and
dividends. The modied measures deviate form those used so far in the way they take into
account changes of the number of shares .
Our empirical approach centered on a dividend-increase-dummy derived from changes of
the amount spent on dividends. As outlined above, one may use a measure based on the
dividends per share instead. This may lead to a di¤erent classication of dividend-paying
rms if the number of shares outstanding changes. Which measure is more appropriate is not
clear. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether our results are a¤ected by the way we
dene dividend changes. In order to do so, we repeated the main regressions of our analysis,
dening dividend changes as changes of the dividends per share. Table 14 summarizes the
results.
In the rst three columns, the independent variable is a dummy which takes the value 1
if the dividends per share in t are higher than the dividends per share in t   1. If the two
numbers are equal and positive, the independent variable is equal to zero.
Although we use a modied measure of dividend increases, the results are qualitatively
the same as in Section 4.2. Specication 1, which is the basic model, demonstrates that
dividend increases are largely due to higher protability and bigger size. Larger former
dividends reduce the probability for increases. Again, we document a negative relation
between the dividend decision and current individual stock price performance. Consistent
with our previous results, we do not nd a signicant impact of the price development in
the past. The dividend decision is not a¤ected by the return in the pre-announcement year,
either.
To verify that our results are not driven by return measures improperly corrected for
stock splits, we regressed the dividend decision on the annual change of the companys
market value. The market value is dened as stock price at the end of the year, multiplied
by the number of shares outstanding. Table 15 presents the regression results. In general,
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the overall picture is not a¤ected by the way we measure the stock price performance. The
estimates closely resemble the estimates of the previous regressions. For dividend increases,
the coe¢ cient of R12 remains negative and signicant.
7 Conclusion
A great deal of research has been devoted to understanding why rms pay dividends. The
traditional view, embodied in the Miller-Modigliani theory, does not allow for a dividend
policy since it rules out any impact of the dividends paid on the rms value. Asymmetric-
information models emphasize the role of dividends as methods to convey good news or
to mitigate existing agency problems. However, empirical attempts to verify these theories
uncovered ambiguous evidence.
In this paper, we took a di¤erent approach. Instead of looking for some sort of potential
impact of the dividend policy on the market value of the company, we state that it is the
market dynamic that drives the dividend increase decision. Thus, we claim that one should
study not only the e¤ect of dividend payments on the price but also examine the inverse
relationship. Dividend increases seem to be, at least partly, driven by poor stock price
returns. The subsequent discussion demonstrated that the documented pattern can hardly
be explained by signaling or agency theories. In addition, we could not nd any evidence
supporting the catering theory.
In summary, the impact of the stock price performance on the dividend decision in Ger-
many closely resembles the negative sensibility of repurchase activity to stock price changes
in the US or in Canada. Numerous studies have found that current undervaluation (or at
least,the perceived undervaluation) plays an important role in the managements decision to
repurchase (see, e.g. Netter and Mitchell (1989) or Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen
(2000)). This suggests that in Germany, where share repurchases were hardly restricted,
dividends may share common functions with share buybacks. In turn, this implies that the
negative sensitivity of share repurchase activity should be attributed not only to smart
managers, trying to take advantage of a temporary mispricing (as in Stein (1996)), but may
be also because the management intends to compensate shareholders for the poor stock price
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performance.
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Table 1: Increasers by year
Table 1 details the number of dividend increases and the number of control events by year. The rst column
displays the number of companies in the sample in every year. The next six columns contain the number of
dividend increasing (dD>0) and decreasing (dD<0) rms as well as the number of companies that do not
change the dividend (dD=0). A dividend increase is dened as a higher ordinary cash dividend, compared
to the dividend paid out in the previous year. The corresponding gures are derived either from the amount
spent on dividend payments (rst three columns) or from the dividends per share (the next three columns
in the Table).
Amount Spent on Div. Div. Per Share
Year # Comp. dD>0 dD=0 dD<0 dD>0 dD=0 dD<0
1982 67 28 15 11 20 12 22
1983 67 27 16 12 24 14 17
1984 72 33 16 7 29 14 13
1985 85 40 18 6 36 15 13
1986 91 46 18 9 40 15 18
1987 97 45 27 5 38 25 14
1988 112 32 36 10 33 30 15
1989 175 38 45 9 32 36 24
1990 206 79 46 17 65 34 43
1991 221 102 42 20 91 33 40
1992 224 109 46 24 96 42 41
1993 237 87 63 30 75 54 51
1994 261 90 49 44 83 37 63
1995 283 116 33 38 101 30 56
1996 296 125 44 30 102 34 63
1997 326 109 38 47 92 36 66
1998 374 124 56 29 110 45 54
1999 473 154 46 44 130 38 76
2000 594 150 47 57 129 37 88
2001 658 178 27 61 166 22 78
2002 619 145 31 69 139 29 77
2003 557 122 20 73 113 17 85
Total 6095 1979 779 652 1744 649 1017
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Table 4: Logit analysis of the dividend-increase decision
Table 4 presents the estimates of a logit regression model that relates the dividend-increase-decision to a set
of rm-specic nancial characteristics and di¤erent measures of the stock price performance. The dependent
variable is equal one if the company increases the dividend (and pays dividends in the year before) and is
equal zero if the dividend is held constant. R12 is the annual return of the company, measured from December
to December. R06 is the annual return of the company, measured from June to June. All regressions include
industry dummies to control for potential industry impact. The reported p-values are derived using robust
Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator. * indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%;
*** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
size 1.204*** 1.218*** 1.224*** 1.190*** 1.228***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
d(TA)/TA 0,139 0,108 0,105 0,145 0,09
(0,187) (0,244) (0,199) (0,198) (0,240)
MtB 0.035* 0.047* 0.035* 0.037* 0,03
(0,066) (0,069) (0,091) (0,069) (0,107)
EBIT/TA 1,641 1,658 2.087* 1.883* 1.869*
(0,126) (0,136) (0,061) (0,076) (0,092)
EBIT t 1/TAt 1 8.909*** 8.987*** 8.416*** 8.799*** 8.494***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Neg. EBIT -0,037 -0,115 -0,070 -0,074 -0,047
(0,902) (0,702) (0,814) (0,806) (0,873)
Debt/TA 0,244 0,158 0,211 0,185 0,262
(0,469) (0,641) (0,538) (0,586) (0,445)
Cap. Exp. 0,329 0.366* 0,348 0.363* 0,334
(0,121) (0,082) (0,109) (0,096) (0,117)
Div t 1/TAt 1 -29.352*** -30.331*** -30.184*** -30.102*** -29.283***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Constant -0.426* -0.441* -0.411* -0.417* -0.416*
(0,056) (0,051) (0,069) (0,063) (0,064)
R12 -0.470***
(0,000)
R12 ; t 1 -0,156
(0,156)
R06 -0.299***
(0,009)
R06 ; t 1 0,145
(0,217)
Observations 2702 2702 2596 2692 2584
Pseudo R2 0,074 0,079 0,073 0,075 0,073
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Table 5: Logit analysis of the dividend-increase decision
Table 5 presents the estimates of a logit regression model that relates the dividend-increase-decision to
aggregate market movements. The dependent variable is equal one if the company increases the dividend
(and pays dividends in the year before) and is equal zero if the dividend is held constant. In all specications,
aggregate measures of market movements are added to the basic model of Table 4. All regressions include
industry dummies to control for potential industry impact. The reported p-values are derived using robust
Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator. * indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%;
*** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size 1.150*** 1.073*** 1.158*** 1.162*** 1.232*** 1.234***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d(TA)/TA 0.114 0.151 0.13 0.131 0.128 0.127
(0.206) (0.197) (0.191) (0.191) (0.209) (0.209)
MtB 0.039** 0.041** 0.036* 0.036* 0.040* 0.040*
(0.049) (0.044) (0.068) (0.069) (0.063) (0.062)
EBIT/TA 1.47 1.554 (1.605) (1.613) 1.669 1.668
(0.184) (0.147) (0.137) (0.134) (0.117) (0.118)
EBITt 1/TAt 1 9.178*** 8.951*** 8.962*** 8.944*** 8.918*** 8.923***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Neg. EBIT -0.076 -0.162 -0.041 -0.039 -0.072 -0.073
(0.800) (0.587) (0.891) (0.896) (0.811) (0.809)
Debt/TA 0.116 -0.018 0.193 0.206 0.227 0.226
(0.734) (0.958) (0.568) (0.541) (0.500) (0.504)
Cap. Exp. 0.34 0.399* 0.342 0.344 0.34 0.337
(0.101) (0.100) (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.110)
Divt 1/TAt 1 -30.916*** -31.934*** -29.965*** -29.840*** -29.511*** -29.520***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.357 -0.266 -0.335 -0.342 -0.476** -0.480**
(0.110) (0.242) (0.132) (0.123) (0.033) (0.031)
Mean(R12) -0.920***
(0.000)
Mean(R06) -1.522***
(0.000)
CDAX -0.476***
(0.005)
DAX -0.396**
(0.014)
R12-Mean(R12) -0.224**
(0.043)
R12-CDAX -0.224**
(0.035)
Observations 2702 2692 2702 2702 2702 2702
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.085 0.076 0.076 0.075 0.075
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Table 6: Logit analysis of the dividend-increase decision
Table 6 presents the estimates of a logit regression model of the dividend-decrease-decision. The dependent
variable is equal one if the company increases the dividend (and pays dividends in the year before) and is
equal zero if the dividend is held constant.. All regressions include industry dummies to control for potential
industry impact. The reported p-values are derived using robust Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator.
* indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
size 0.979*** 0.993*** 1.111*** 0.994*** 0.978*** 0.943*** 0.962***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
d(TA)/TA -0.189 -0.199 -0.552** -0.165 -0.212 -0.199 -0.184
(0.223) (0.197) (0.049) (0.284) (0.175) (0.197) (0.237)
MtB -0.019 -0.015 -0.01 -0.009 -0.017 -0.018 -0.022
(0.421) (0.538) (0.679) (0.726) (0.481) (0.448) (0.356)
EBIT/TA -1.177 -1.116 -0.069 -0.713 -1.267 -(1.218) -1.227
(0.328) (0.354) (0.955) (0.561) (0.297) (0.314) (0.314)
EBITt 1/TAt 1 1.773 1.708 0.62 1.364 1.748 1.658 1.794
(0.222) (0.228) (0.643) (0.316) (0.213) (0.236) (0.220)
Neg. EBIT 0.745** 0.725** 0.660** 0.694** 0.707** 0.724** 0.755**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.029) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010)
Debt/TA 0.309 0.278 0.295 0.166 0.267 0.237 0.315
(0.442) (0.490) (0.482) (0.684) (0.499) (0.547) (0.433)
Cap. Exp. -2.005* -1.951* -2.603** -1.891* -1.969* -1.986* -2.038*
(0.075) (0.082) (0.038) (0.092) (0.079) (0.073) (0.070)
Divt 1/TAt 1 0.657 0.612 0.340 0.514 0.606 0.601 0.676
(0.850) (0.840) (0.750) (0.808) (0.808) (0.817) (0.850)
Constant -0.587* -0.596** -0.634** -0.622** -0.556* -0.487 -0.560*
(0.055) (0.048) (0.038) (0.036) (0.062) (0.104) (0.071)
R12 0.091
(0.687)
R12; t 1 -0.334
(0.139)
R06 -0.173
(0.439)
Mean(R12) -0.139
(0.712)
CDAX -0.203
(0.454)
R12-Mean(R12) 0.188
(0.367)
Observations 1390 1390 1333 1387 1390 1390 1390
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.049 0.063 0.053 0.05 0.051 0.048
42
T
ab
le
7:
M
ar
ke
t
to
B
oo
k
an
d
A
n
nu
al
R
et
u
rn
ar
ou
n
d
D
iv
id
en
d
In
cr
ea
se
s:
C
at
eg
or
ic
al
A
n
al
ys
is
T
he
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
m
ea
n
m
ar
ke
t-
to
-b
oo
k
va
lu
es
,
m
ea
n
ye
ar
ly
ch
an
ge
s
in
m
ar
ke
t-
to
-b
oo
k,
an
d
m
ea
n
an
nu
al
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
th
re
e
ty
p
es
of
co
m
pa
ni
es
.
E
ac
h
r
m
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
w
it
h
p
os
it
iv
e
pa
st
an
d
cu
rr
en
t
di
vi
de
nd
s
is
as
si
gn
ed
to
on
e
of
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
gr
ou
ps
.
D
ec
re
as
er
s
re
du
ce
th
e
di
vi
de
nd
,
th
e
gr
ou
p
C
on
ti
nu
e
pa
y
co
nt
ai
ns
di
vi
de
nd
pa
ye
rs
th
at
ke
ep
th
e
le
ve
l
of
th
e
di
vi
de
nd
pa
ym
en
t
un
ch
an
ge
d,
in
cr
ea
se
rs
ar
e
r
m
s
th
at
in
cr
ea
se
th
e
di
vi
de
nd
.
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
a
n
an
ci
al
ye
ar
en
d
de
vi
at
in
g
fr
om
th
e
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
en
d
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
.
Q
3 t
Q
4 t
Q
1 t
+
1
Q
2 t
+
1
Q
3 t
+
1
Q
4 t
+
1
Q
3 t
Q
4 t
Q
1 t
+
1
Q
2 t
+
1
Q
3 t
+
1
Q
4 t
+
1
(M
ed
ia
n)
(M
V
+
D
eb
t)
/(
B
E
+
D
eb
t)
R
1
2
D
ec
re
as
es
1.
47
1.
43
1.
49
1.
52
1.
46
1.
45
D
ec
re
as
es
-2
.9
2%
-3
.4
5%
1.
43
%
1.
82
%
-2
.9
3%
-2
.6
0%
C
on
ti
nu
es
1.
65
1.
63
1.
62
1.
69
1.
61
1.
53
C
on
ti
nu
es
-1
.0
3%
-2
.2
9%
2.
36
%
2.
88
%
-1
.2
8%
-2
.8
1%
In
cr
ea
se
s
1.
71
1.
61
1.
57
1.
63
1.
60
1.
52
In
cr
ea
se
s
-3
.8
9%
-3
.7
7%
1.
68
%
3.
36
%
-2
.3
6%
-3
.0
3%
p-
va
lu
es
p-
va
lu
es
In
cr
.=
D
ec
r.
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
07
6
0.
03
2
0.
01
4
0.
03
2
In
cr
.=
D
ec
r.
0.
12
7
0.
72
9
0.
66
5
0.
09
7
0.
60
7
0.
76
3
In
cr
.=
C
on
st
.
0.
18
0
0.
52
8
0.
96
5
0.
96
1
0.
76
2
0.
70
8
In
cr
.=
C
on
st
.
0.
00
0
0.
01
6
0.
15
8
0.
82
1
0.
03
2
0.
99
0
(M
V
+
D
eb
t)
/(
B
E
+
D
eb
t)
R
1
2
-M
ea
n(
R
1
2
)
D
ec
re
as
es
-2
.1
5%
-2
.4
5%
2.
32
%
1.
13
%
-1
.9
3%
-1
.7
4%
D
ec
re
as
es
2.
73
%
0.
77
%
-0
.1
1%
1.
14
%
1.
44
%
-0
.2
1%
C
on
ti
nu
es
-0
.6
1%
-1
.3
1%
0.
32
%
1.
79
%
-0
.4
3%
-1
.4
7%
C
on
ti
nu
es
1.
44
%
0.
40
%
-0
.9
9%
0.
67
%
1.
84
%
0.
23
%
In
cr
ea
se
s
-2
.8
4%
-2
.6
5%
-1
.0
3%
2.
29
%
-1
.5
9%
-2
.1
0%
In
cr
ea
se
s
0.
75
%
-0
.4
3%
-0
.3
3%
2.
12
%
0.
63
%
-0
.6
2%
p-
va
lu
es
p-
va
lu
es
In
cr
.=
D
ec
r.
0.
07
6
0.
69
8
0.
00
0
0.
17
7
0.
72
9
0.
68
8
In
cr
.=
D
ec
r.
0.
02
7
0.
46
8
0.
57
1
0.
12
9
0.
97
1
0.
71
3
In
cr
.=
C
on
st
.
0.
00
0
0.
00
7
0.
09
9
0.
90
3
0.
01
6
0.
95
9
In
cr
.=
C
on
st
.
0.
40
2
0.
03
8
0.
87
8
0.
15
1
0.
30
9
0.
35
5
43
44
Table 8: The Relationship between Market Valuation and the Dividend Decision
The table reports the estimates of Models (3) and (4). The dependent variable CE1 is the change in earnings
from year 0 to year 1, scaled by the book value of total assets at the end of year 0, E1/TA0is earnings before
interests and taxes in year 1 divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year 0. DPC (DNC)
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. CE0 is
the change in earnings from year -1 to year 0, scaled by the book value of total assets at the end of year
-1. The earnings in t are measure by the operating prot in t. DFE0 is equal to ROA0-E[ROA0], where
ROA0 is equal to the operating prot in 0, scaled by the book value of total assets at the end of year 0.
E[ROA0] is equal to the tted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROA0 on the logarithm of total
assets in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio in year -1, and ROA 1. NDFED0 (PDFED0) is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. NCED0 (PCED0)
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. All regressions
include industry dummies to control for potential xed e¤ects. The reported p-values are derived using
robust Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator. * indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance
at 5%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.
CE1 CE1
Overall Overall
ROA -0.422***
(0.000)
DFE 0.039
(0.816)
NDFED*DFE -0.629***
(0.006)
NDFED*DFE*DFE 0.577***
(0.000)
PDFED*DFE*DFE -0.154
(0.623)
CE -0.670*** -0.111
(0.000) (0.424)
NCED*CE 0.370*
(0.058)
NCED*CE*CE 0.351**
(0.041)
PCED*CE*CE 0.041
(0.676)
Constant 0.000 0.001
(0.988) (0.828)
DPC 0.028 -0.002
(0.254) (0.477)
DNC 0.072 -0.008
(0.447) (0.185)
Observations 2451 2451
R2 0.051 0.208
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Table 9: Average Return for Advancing and Declining Markets
The Table reports the average annual return to dividend- and non-dividend-paying stocks (rts part) as
well as the average annual return for dividend increasing stocks and stocks with unchanged dividens. The
returns are computed for the whole sample and for the subsamples identied as advancing or declining
markets. Advancing markets are the years when the CDAX index earned a positive return or a higher return
than the REX index.
Payers Non-Payers Di¤erence p-value CDAX CDAX (adj)
-0.011 -0.035 0.024 0.142
-0.111 -0.326 0.216 0.000 -0.210
0.054 0.259 -0.205 0.000 0.256
-0.092 -0.296 0.204 0.000 -0.234
0.089 0.316 -0.228 0.000 0.255
dD>0 dD=0 Di¤erence p-value CDAX CDAX (adj)
-0.023 0.037 -0.059 0.000
-0.115 -0.054 -0.061 0.013 -0.210
0.040 0.086 -0.046 0.040 0.256
-0.095 -0.035 -0.059 0.002 -0.234
0.071 0.111 -0.040 0.155 0.255
dD>0 dD=0 Di¤erence p-value CDAX CDAX (adj)
-0.014 0.035 -0.048 0.005
-0.110 -0.067 -0.044 0.079 -0.210
0.052 0.095 -0.043 0.053 0.256
-0.090 -0.064 -0.027 0.196 -0.234
0.075 0.156 -0.081 0.003 0.255
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Table 10: The Increase Decision, Dividend Premium and Investment Opportuni-
ties
In Table 10, we relate the increase decision to the dividend-premium measure. In addition, we try to
disentangle the sentiment for dividend payment from the relative valuation of the current or future growth
perspectives of dividend payers by controlling for the current growth rate of dividend payers and nonpayers.
d(TA)/TA (P ) (d(TA)/TA (NP)) is the mean assets growth rate of payers (nonpayers). Cap. Exp. Di¤. is
the log di¤erence between the mean capital expenditures of payers and non-payers in t (deated by the total
assets). Div. Disc.(dTA/TA) is equal to the mean modied market-to-book of non-payers, divided by the
mean modied market-to-book of payers. The modied market-to-book is computed from the residuals of a
regression that relates the market-to-book ratio to the assets growth. Div. Disc. (Cap. Exp.) is calculated
in the same way. * indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%; *** indicates signicance
at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size 1.087*** 1.104*** 0.995*** 1.104*** 0.989*** 1.088***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d(TA)/TA 0.134 0.136 0.118 0.133 0.128 0.133
(0.195) (0.199) (0.191) (0.202) (0.186) (0.197)
MtB 0.034** 0.035** 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** 0.034**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030)
EBIT/TA 1.593 1.62 (1.417) (1.606) 1.501 (1.585)
(0.136) (0.129) (0.185) (0.133) (0.158) (0.138)
EBITt 1/TAt 1 9.331*** 9.273*** 9.410*** 9.304*** 9.312*** 9.319***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Neg. EBIT -0.004 0.01 -0.043 0.004 -0.033 -0.004
(0.988) (0.972) (0.883) (0.990) (0.909) (0.989)
Debt/TA 0.367 0.414 0.252 0.398 0.274 0.375
(0.272) (0.214) (0.456) (0.236) (0.418) (0.260)
Cap. Exp. 0.263 0.261 0.285 0.261 0.311 0.264
(0.182) (0.185) (0.156) (0.184) (0.130) (0.179)
Divt 1/TAt 1 -29.919*** -29.542*** -30.910*** -29.601*** -30.659*** -29.798***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.348* -0.281 -0.367 -0.329 -0.135 -0.326
(0.099) (0.193) (0.130) (0.118) (0.541) (0.122)
Div. Prem -0.033 -0.014 -0.035
(0.568) (0.809) (0.563)
Div. Prem. (vw.) 0.033
(0.340)
d(TA)/TA (P) 0.574
(0.542)
d(TA)/TA (NP) 0.318
(0.170)
Div. Disc.(dTA/TA) 0.003
(0.757)
Cap. Exp. Di¤. -0.530***
(0.004)
Div. Dsic. (Cap. Exp) -0.005
(0.631)
Observations 2702 2702 2702 2702 2702 2702
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.071 0.069
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Table 11: Dividend Decision and Year Dummies
Table 11 presents the estimates of a logit regression model that relates the dividend decision to current and
past individual stock price movements. In the rst three specications, the dependent variable is equal one
if the company increases the amount spent on dividends (and pays dividends in the year before) and is equal
zero if the dividends are held constant. Models (4) to (6) examine the decrease decision. R12 is the annual
return of the company, measured from December to December. All regressions include industry dummies to
control for potential industry impact and year dummies to capture potential year xed e¤ects. The reported
p-values are derived using robust Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator. * indicates signicance at
10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size 0.924*** 0.931*** 0.972*** 0.505 0.508 0.689**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.103) (0.102) (0.032)
d(TA)/TA 0.195 0.181 0.146 -0.098 -0.100 -0.331
(0.204) (0.234) (0.228) (0.548) (0.541) (0.210)
MtB 0.050** 0.056** 0.048** -0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.012) (0.020) (0.021) (0.975) (0.999) (0.916)
EBIT/TA 1.518 1.581 1.926* -2.034* -2.018 -(1.021)
(0.188) (0.149) (0.094) (0.096) (0.102) (0.421)
EBITt 1 /TAt 1 9.554*** 9.528*** 9.031*** 1.133 1.120 0.144
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.426) (0.430) (0.919)
Neg. EBIT -0.242 -0.28 -0.254 0.432** 0.429** 0.421**
(0.425) (0.356) (0.401) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Debt/TA -0.299 -0.323 -0.302 -0.689 -0.693 -0.663
(0.425) (0.388) (0.422) (0.114) (0.112) (0.151)
Cap. Exp. 0.711 0.723 0.803 -0.929 -0.917 -1.785
(0.249) (0.238) (0.232) (0.379) (0.388) (0.120)
Divt 1 /TAt 1 -36.376*** -36.709*** -36.718*** 0.003 0.000 -0.070
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.996) (0.999) (0.883)
Constant -0.474 -0.469 -0.477 -0.054 -0.056 -0.099
(0.218) (0.222) (0.217) (0.916) (0.913) (0.849)
R12 -0.277** -0.031
(0.048) (0.872)
R12 ; t 1 -0.006 -0.734*
(0.962) (0.091)
Observations 2702 2702 2596 1390 1390 1333
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.111 0.109 0.114 0.114 0.12
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Table 12: Robustness check of the relation between the dividend decision and the
stock price evolution: Fama-MacBeth estimates
Table 12 the estimates of a logit regression model that relates the dividend decision to current and past
individual stock price movements. In the rst three specications, the dependent variable is equal one if the
company increases the amount spent on dividends (and pays dividends in the year before) and is equal zero
if the dividends are held constant. Models (4) to (6) examine the decrease decision. R12 is the annual return
of the company, measured from December to December. The logit regression is estimated for each year.
The Table shows means (across years) of the regression coe¢ cients, and t-statistics for the means, dened
as the mean divided by its standard error. * indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%;
*** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size 0.834*** 0.788** 0.93*** 1.205*** 0.959 1.696*
(2.762) (2.452) (3.184) (2.900) (1.275) (1.797)
d(TA)/TA 0.654 0.654 0.636 0.378 -0.292 -0.817
(1.508) (1.637) (1.472) (0.309) -(0.188) -(0.556)
MtB 0.032 0.066 0.029 -0.296 -0.291 -0.389
(0.491) (0.913) (0.455) -(1.511) -(1.459) -(1.211)
EBIT/TA 4.034 5.042 (4.845) -16.592 -21.518 -(26.960)
(1.258) (1.423) (1.613) -(1.579) -(1.307) -(1.084)
EBITt 1 /TAt 1 9.901*** 9.746*** 9.663*** -1.755 2.229 3.653
(3.101) (2.965) (3.351) -(0.180) (0.131) (0.169)
Neg. EBIT -0.272 -0.271 -0.368 0.382 0.437* 0.429
-(1.056) -(0.983) -(1.470) (1.488) (1.678) (1.610)
Debt/TA 2.505 2.919 2.637 2.498 4.978 3.691
(1.200) (1.183) (1.259) (1.441) (1.334) (1.258)
Cap. Exp. -0.632 -0.735 -0.635 -8.053* -13.202* -13.534*
-(0.517) -(0.568) -(0.506) -(1.811) -(1.754) -(1.677)
Divt 1 /TAt 1 -40.139*** -43.838*** -41.451*** 82.372** 74.796** 116.525**
-(3.965) -(3.977) -(4.150) (2.412) (2.409) (1.971)
Constant -0.129 -0.118 -0.209 -0.637** 0.235 -0.904*
-(0.322) -(0.294) -(0.530) -(2.036) (0.389) -(1.881)
R12 -0.703*** -1.062
-(2.598) -(1.126)
R12 ; t 1 -0.260 -2.368
-(0.957) -(1.032)
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Table 13: Ordered logit analysis of the relation between the decision to increase
dividends and the stock price evolution
Table 13 presents the estimates of an ordinal logit regression model that relates the dividend decision to
current and past individual stock price movements. The dependent variable is equal 1 if the company
increases the dividends (and pays dividends in the year before), 0 if the dividends are constant, and -1 if the
dividends are decreased. R12 is the annual return of the company, measured from December to December.
All regressions include industry dummies to control for potential industry impact. The reported p-values
are derived using robust Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator. * indicates signicance at 10%; **
indicates signicance at 5%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
size 0.655* 0.670* 0.668* 0.081 1.048*** 0.023 0.784***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.038) (0.646) (0.000) (0.895) (0.000)
d(TA)/TA 0.161 0.136 0.321* 0.17 0.122 0.638** 0.279
(0.208) (0.250) (0.041) (0.240) (0.293) (0.005) (0.065)
MtB 0.035* 0.042* 0.028 0.047 0.04 0.035 0.040*
(0.047) (0.044) (0.131) (0.095) (0.103) (0.143) (0.022)
EBIT/TA 1.324 1.426 (1.095) 1.39 0.584 1.124 (0.956)
(0.264) (0.272) (0.389) (0.057) . (0.222) (0.225)
EBITt 1/TAt 1 5.486 5.422 5.27 1.767* 4.868*** 3.385*** 7.051***
(0.093) (0.099) (0.087) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Neg. EBIT -0.725** -0.769** -0.701** -0.986*** -0.726*** -0.738*** -0.644**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Debt/TA 0.092 0.03 0.074 -0.012 0.315 -0.063 0.196
(0.768) (0.926) (0.820) (0.963) (0.147) (0.809) (0.373)
Cap. Exp. 0.949 0.977 1.191 2.218** 0.837 2.400** 0.764
(0.150) (0.139) (0.073) (0.003) (0.125) (0.002) (0.155)
Divt 1/TAt 1 -15.384 -15.735 -12.844 -3.973*** -4.091 -4.916*** -21.697***
(0.433) (0.427) (0.528) (0.000) . (0.000) (0.000)
cut1 -(0.548) -(0.538) -(0.521)
(0.127) (0.133) (0.167)
cut2 0.662* 0.677* 0.702*
(0.031) (0.027) (0.031)
Constant 0.991*** -0.905*** 0.962*** -0.626***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R12 -0.327** -0.136 -0.340**
(0.002) (0.278) (0.001)
R12; t 1 0.230 0.593*** 0.117
(0.064) (0.000) (0.253)
Observations 3338 3338 3198 3338 3198
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.046 0.043 0.046 0.057
51
Table 14: Dividends per Share
Table 14 presents the estimates of a logit regression model that relates the dividend decision to current and
past individual stock price movements. In the rst three specications, the dependent variable is equal one if
the company increases the dividends per share (and pays dividends in the year before) and is equal zero if the
dividends are held constant. Models (4) to (6) examine the decrease decision. R12 is the annual return of the
company, measured from December to December. All regressions include industry dummies to control for
potential industry impact. The reported p-values are derived using robust Huber/White/Sandwich variance
estimator. * indicates signicance at 10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size 1.382*** 1.422*** 1.400*** 1.432*** 1.473*** 1.507***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d(TA)/TA 0.237 0.201 0.186 0.426* 0.363 0.327
(0.213) (0.305) (0.349) (0.069) (0.116) (0.162)
MtB 0.031 0.045 0.036 0.032 0.056 0.036
(0.108) (0.109) (0.136) (0.159) (0.121) (0.151)
EBIT/TA 1.606 1.626 (1.976) -0.177 0.102 (0.406)
(0.169) (0.175) (0.105) (0.891) (0.937) (0.760)
EBITt 1/TAt 1 8.985*** 9.116*** 8.499*** 2.588** 1.991 1.917
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.115) (0.129)
Neg. EBIT -0.062 -0.15 -0.093 0.519* 0.394 0.486
(0.850) (0.647) (0.775) (0.089) (0.197) (0.116)
Debt/TA 0.347 0.252 0.365 0.586 0.434 0.689*
(0.339) (0.493) (0.330) (0.144) (0.295) (0.095)
Cap. Exp. 0.236 0.286 0.251 -1.004 -0.966 -1.159
(0.225) (0.143) (0.196) (0.183) (0.206) (0.157)
Divt 1/TAt 1 -29.478*** -30.352*** -30.003*** 0.059 -0.014 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.910) (0.976) (0.991)
Constant -0.459* -0.489** -0.454* -0.608** -0.617** -0.645**
(0.054) (0.044) (0.060) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010)
R12 -0.528*** -0.095
(0.000) (0.547)
R12; t 1 -0.085 -0.923***
(0.467) (0.000)
Observations 2342 2342 2250 1622 1622 1555
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.088 0.082 0.048 0.069 0.047
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Table 15: Alternative Measure of Stock Price Performance
Table 15 presents the estimates of a logit regression model that relates the dividend-increase-decision to
current and past individual stock price movements.The dependent variable is equal one if the company
increases the amount spent on dividends (and pays dividends in the year before) and is equal zero if the
dividends are held constant. MVt is the market value of the company, dened as the stock price at the end
of year t multiplied by the number of shares outstanding in t. All regressions include industry dummies to
control for potential industry impact and year dummies to capture potential year xed e¤ects. The reported
p-values are derived using robust Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator. * indicates signicance at
10%; ** indicates signicance at 5%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size 1.204*** 1.208*** 1.225*** 0.979*** 0.992*** 1.092***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
d(TA)/TA 0.139 0.135 0.069 -0.189 -0.199 -0.661**
(0.187) (0.197) (0.303) (0.223) (0.199) (0.018)
MtB 0.035* 0.040* 0.029 -0.019 -0.014 -0.019
(0.066) (0.072) (0.104) (0.421) (0.555) (0.415)
EBIT/TA 1.641 1.661 (1.787) -1.177 -1.054 -(0.702)
(0.126) (0.121) (0.106) (0.328) (0.380) (0.564)
EBITt 1 /TAt 1 8.909*** 8.960*** 8.506*** 1.773 1.674 1.07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.222) (0.237) (0.428)
Neg. EBIT -0.037 -0.072 -0.039 0.745** 0.704** 0.673**
(0.902) (0.810) (0.896) (0.011) (0.016) (0.024)
Debt/TA 0.244 0.235 0.269 0.309 0.316 0.512
(0.469) (0.484) (0.429) (0.442) (0.430) (0.205)
Cap. Exp. 0.329 0.347 0.329 -2.005* -1.975* -2.654**
(0.121) (0.109) (0.120) (0.075) (0.079) (0.033)
Divt 1 /TAt 1 -29.352*** -29.634*** -29.264*** 0.657 0.606 0.422
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.850) (0.842) (0.770)
Constant -0.426* -0.427* -0.422* -0.587* -0.578* -0.588*
(0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.051)
(MVt -MVt 1 )/MVt 1 -0.149** -0.192
(0.049) (0.705)
(MVt 1 -MVt 2 )/MVt 2 0.160* 0.005
(0.071) (0.949)
Observations 2702 2702 2596 1390 1390 1333
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.076 0.074 0.048 0.05 0.052
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